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INTRODUCTION 
A post-employment non-compete covenant is an agreement by an 
employee that, after termination of employment he or she will not com-
pete with his or her former employer-usually within a specified 
geographic area and for a specified period of time. Such covenants 
are standard parts of many employment contracts. I 
Under the long standing common law of contracts, non-compete 
covenants are generally suspect as restraints of trade. 2 Post-employment 
non-compete covenants also bear a strong presumption of unfairness 
because of the superior bargaining power almost invariably wielded 
by the employer. 3 Nevertheless most jurisdictions, including Texas, have 
traditionally enforced post-employment non-compete covenants within 
the constraints of the reasonableness test described below. 
Recently, however, courts in several jurisdictions have begun to 
view non-compete covenants with increasing disfavor. 4 Indeed, the opin-
ions in two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Texas cast 
serious doubt upon the continuing viability of such covenants in Texas. S 
Unfortunately, both opinions are flawed in their reasoning and con-
fused in their application of the law. Therefore, their predictive value 
is unclear. 
The purpose of this article is to (1) identify the policy issues and 
conflicting interests; (2) describe the common law rules generally ap-
plied in most U.S. jurisdictions and examples of some statutory ef-
forts to resolve the dilemma; (3) describe and critique the relevant Texas 
law as it existed prior to the two most recent cases; and (4) discuss 
these cases against the above-described background. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE DILEMMA; THE "SOLUTIONS" 
A. Policy Issues 
The basic dilemma is the confrontation between· two interests so 
at. Texas Southern University in Houston and a Visiting Professor at Loyola Law School in 
Los Angeles. . 
1. Closius and Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement 
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 57 So. CAL. REV. 531, 532 (1984) .. 
2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sec. 186 (1979). 
3. Id. at Sec. 188 comment g. 
4. See, "Courts Skeptical of 'Non-Compete' Pacts", Wall Street Journal, Jan. II, 1989, 
page BI. . 
5. Martin v. Credit Protecting Association, 31 TEXAS SUPREME COURT J. 626 (No. C-7339, 
June 13, 1988) DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 31 TEXAS SUPREME COURT J. 616 (No. C-6617, June 
13, 1988). 
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widely acknowledged that they are often regarded as "rights": (1) an 
employee's interest in having the freedom to accept employment in 
his or her chosen field; and (2) an employer's interest in protecting 
its business by agreeing with an employee that the latter will not com-
pete with the employer for a stated time, within a specified geographic 
area, after employment ceases. 6 Ironically, each of these interests might 
generally' be thought protected by "freedom of contract." 
1. Individual Rights 
"Freedom of contract", while clearly a relevant notion, is perfectly 
ambiguous in this context. The slogan alone will not resolve the dilemma 
presented by the contradiction between sanctity of contract (pacta sunt 
servanda) and freedom to contract (e.g., for the sale of one's personal 
services). Indeed, freedom of contract is almost certainly a misnomer 
if what is meant is that parties should be free to agree to whatever 
terms they like and the state, through its judicial apparatus, should 
enforce those agreements. In reality freedom of contract is neither so 
simple nor so absolute. 
Judicial refusal to enforce contracts involving fraud, duress or in-
capacity, for example, is at once an exception to and a prerequisite 
of freedom of contract. 7 It is a prerequisite because freedom of con-
tract is generally thought meaningful only when parties with contrac-
tual capacity act voluntarily.8 Even when these conditions are met, 
however, the parties are not entirely free to do as they please, for the 
doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability give courts broad 
lattitude to adjust or avoid otherwise valid agreements. 9 
The doctrine of unconscionability is most often invoked in situa-
tions said to involve unequal bargaining power. IO The real issue, 
however, may be protection of the employee/covenantor from his or 
her own willingness to enter an ill-advised and detrimental "bargain" .11 
6. Kniffin. Employee Non-competition Covenants: The Perils of Performing Unique 
Services. 10 RUT. CAM. L.J. 25 (1978). 
7. Professor Duncan Kennedy describes this as "the constitutive character of the excep-
tions to enforcement." Kennedy. Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 
563, 569-70 (1982). 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 614; see also, Uniform Commercial Code Sec. 2-302 comment. "The principle 
is one of the prevention of oppression ... " [d. 
Il. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 634. "Courts using the doctrine of unconscionability like 
to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargaining power ... [b Jut its often obvious that 
they are concerned not with power but with naivete." [d. 
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The question is whether the prospective freedom to sell one's services 
is an interest whose alienation the law should regulate or even for-
bid. 12 The idea that freedom to apply one's (legal) trade is an interest 
"owned" by each individual is neither radical nor new. ll To conclude 
that this interest should be inalienable, however, requires a second, 
more difficult step. The unenforceability of a contract by which one 
agrees to be murdered is scarcely controversial, but the analogy to an 
agreement not to do a particular kind of work in a particular area 
during a particular period of time seems altogether theoretical and at-
tenuated. 14 There would be little basis for objection if, during the period 
of the restraint, the covenantor was paid not to work, but this differs 
from the typical situation only because in the typical situation the 
covenantor is, arguably, paid in advance not to work during the period 
of the restraint. 
2. Economic Issues 
The policy arguments against post-employment non-compete 
covenants would seem especially persuasive when an employer has ter-
minated an employee, or when an employer is using a post-employment 
restriction to pressure an employee not to quit. With respect to the 
latter situation, one court has observed that: 
A covenant that serves primarily to bar an employee from work-
ing for others or for himself in the same competitive field so as 
to discourage him from terminating his employment is a form of 
industrial peonage without redeeming virtue in the American 
economic order. I S 
The court's reference to the "economic order" shifts the focus 
12. See generally, Calebresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity," 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). There are three types of "entitlements": those protected 
by property rules, those protected by liability rules, and those that are inalienable. "An entitle-
ment is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller." Id. at 1092-93. 
13. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (New York 1952) (6th Ed. London 1764) 
"every man has a Property in his own Person . .. the Labour of his Body and the Work of 
his hands ... are properly his." Id. at ch. V, sec. 27. J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation (R. 
Hildreth trans. 1840) (1st ed. 1802). "The idea of property consists in an established expecta-
tion." Id.; Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). "[Tlhe dichotomy between 
personal liberties and property rights in a false one ... In fact, a fundamental interdependence 
exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right to property. Neither COUld. 
have meaning without the other." Id. at 552. See generally, Radin, Property and Personhood 
34 STANFORD L. REV. 957 (1982). 
14. See generally, Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 12, at notes 45-51 and associated text. 
15. Josten's Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Md. 1974). 
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away from fairness to the individual, and toward a distinct policy issue. 
This second issue is social utility and/or efficiency and the question 
is whether society is better off with or without the enforcement of restric-
tive covenants in a given industry or business context. It can be argued, 
in general, that the public interest is best served by enforcing at least 
some post-employment non-compete covenants because they protect 
and, therefore, encourage, employer investment and such investment 
results in better products and services. 16 
The social utility argument against enforcement is also largely 
economic. The court in Reed Roberts Assocs. v. Shauman 17 described 
the economic system's need for "the uninhibited flow of services, talent 
and ideas"18 and went on to state that "no restrictions should fetter 
an employee's right to apply to his own best advantage the skills and 
knowledge acquired by . . . his previous employment." 19 
The potentially significant collective economic impact of post-
employment non-compete restraints has led some authors to advocate 
application of the rules and principles of antitrust law. 20 The Sherman 
Act proscribes "every contract in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several states. "21 But this seemingly absolute prohibition has long 
been tempered by the "rule of reason." 22 As a result, every post-
employment restraint tested under the rule has survived. 23 
16. See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, Sec. 3.1, at 30 (2d ed. 1977); 
Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 96-97 . 
(1981). 
17. 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). 
18. Id. at 593. 
19. Id. 
20. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Step-child: A Proposal for Dealing with 
Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (1973); Sullivan, 
Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Post-Employment Restraints of 
Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621. 
21. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (1976). The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution has long been 
construed as giving Congress significant power over not only interstate activities, but intrastate 
labor-management relations. See e.g., U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941); N.L.R.B. 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,29-32 (1937). Also, although Sec. 6 of the Clayton 
Act stipulates that human labor is not a commodity or article of commence, this definition was 
developed to create room (within the antitrust arena) for labor unions to operate legally. Nichols 
v. Spencer Int'l. Press, Inc. 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1967). 
22. See Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1,57-60 (1910), (acknowledging that every con-
tract restrains trade and, therefore, the prohibition cannot be absolute). 
23. See e.g., Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51,59 (2d Cir. 1974); Frackowiak 
v. Framer Ins. Co. 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D. Kan. 1976); Alders v. A.F.A. Corp. of Fla. 
353 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. 339 F. Supp. 1296, 
1297 (E.D. Wis. 1971). 
At least one author has argued that the survival of the restrictions under antitrust analysis 
results from the courts' failure to consider labor market impact, as opposed to product market 
impact. Product market analysis is the traditional approach, but labor market analysis has been 
employed in some sports cases. Note, The Antitrust Implications of Employee Non-compete 
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In Newburger, Loeb & Co. v.' Gross,24 for example, the Court 
of Appeals for the Secohd Circuit observed that: 
employment agreements not to compete are proper subjects for 
scrutiny under section i of the Sherman Act. When a company 
interferes with free competition for orie ot its former employee's 
services, the market's ability to achieve the most economicaIIy 
efficient aIIocation of labor is impaired . . . ~estraints on post-
employment competition that serve no legitimate purpose at the 
time they are adopted would be per se invalid . . . Even if the clause 
is riot overbroad per se, it might stili be scrutinized for 
unreasonableness: Are the restrictions so burdensome that their anti-
competitive purposes and effect outweighed their justifications? 
Restraints that fail this balancing test might be struck down under 
a rule of reason. 25 
However, in concluding that the restriction at issue was reasonable and, 
therefore, enforceable, the court cited the covenantee's "legitimate in-
terest" in preventing the covenantor from competing for customers 
of the covenantee. 26 
B. The Common Law Approach 
Post-employment restrictive covenants, having their origins in an 
era when apprenticeships approximated indentured servitude, were in-
itially subject to extreme judicial disfavor. 27 A strong belief that such 
Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1982), citing: Radovich v. N.F.L. 
352 U.S. 445, 453-4 (1957); Mackey v. N.F.L. 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. ,1975) cert. dismissed 
434 U.S. SOl (1977). 
24. 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977). 
25. [d. at IOS2. 
26. [d. Newburger, involving a securities brokerage firm, demonstrates the circularity of 
embarking upon an antitrust analysis and ultimately testing the covenant against a standard not 
appreciably different from the one that would have applied in the absence of the antitrust rhetoric. 
See infra, notes 31-34 and associated text. Arguing that the economic issues remain relevant, 
however, Professor Sullivan has suggested that "the courts should take into account market 
impact in a more explicit and serious manner than they have so far." Sullivan, supra note 20 
at 647. He advocates consideration of five factors in evaluating post-employment non-compete 
covenants: (1) the totality of the anti-competitive restraints imposed by the employer involved; 
(2) extent to which there is a pattern of such restraints in the relevant industry; (3) the state 
of competition in the industry, and, more specifically, in the relevant geographic market; (4) 
the scope of the restraint's prohibition and the remedy provided for violations; and (5) the nature 
of the employee restrained, with special disfavor for restraints on employees who are particularly 
valuable to competitors. Finally, Professor Sullivan suggests that courts subject proffered employer 
justifications to a higher degree of scrutiny. [d. at 647-49. 
27. The earliest recorded case concerning a post employment restrictive convenant was decided 
in 1414. The case involved an agreement by a dyer to refrain from, practicing his. trade ·for a 
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covenants constituted restraints of trade and were inherently repug-
nant to public policy dominated the first two centuries of English case 
law on the topic. 28 In the 16th century, however, courts gradually 
diminished the prohibition against such restraints, allowing enforce-
ment if the covenant was reasonable with respect to duration, geographic 
area, and benefit to the covenantee, and there was no violation of public 
policy.29 
The general common law rule today is that a post-employment 
non-compete covenant is enforceable if it is supported by considera-
tion and reasonable as to geographic scope, duration, ;'lnd range of 
activities prohibited. 30 "Reasonableness" is determined against the 
backdrop of an ostensibly independent determihation regarding the 
legitimacy of the business interests for which the former employer Seeks 
protection. 31 
Many courts apply stricter standards to teSt the enforceability of 
non-compete covenants associated with employment contracts as 
distinguished from those for sales of businesses or dissolutions of 
partnerships.32 hi a further effort to discourage employer attempts to 
obtain unjustifiably broad protection, some courts refuse to enforce 
non-compete covenants that appear to have been drafted or included 
in bad faith. 33 
1. Consideration for Employee's Covenimt 
If a non-compete covenant is executed simultaneously with and 
as part of an employment contract, the employment itself constitutes 
period of six months after the termination of his employment by the covenantee. The court 
judge refused to issue the injunction sought by the covenantee and was so incensed he declared 
that, if the plaintiff had been present in court, he would imprison him until the plaintiff paid 
a fine to the king. The Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5 f, pI. 26 (C.P. 1414). 
28. Patterson, The Law of Contracts 'in Restraint of Trade at 34 (1891). 
29. Id. 
30. Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) provides, at Sec. 188(1), that a non-compete 
covenant is unreasonable if 
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate in-
terest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor 
and the likely injury to the public. 
See e.g., Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950,951 (Tex. 1960); Hill v. Mobile 
Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987). ' , 
31. Id., See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, Section 188, comment d. 
32. See e.g., American Hot Rod Assoc. v. Carrier 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974), Accord. 
C.O. Caster Co. v. Regan 357 N.E.2d 162 (Ill. 1976). The differentiated standard dates back 
at least to Mitcheil v. Reynolds, 1 P.W.ms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). , 
33. E. Farnsworth, Contracts, Sec. 5.8, at 363. 
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consideration for the covenant. 34 In most jurisdictions mere continua-
tion of employment does not constitute consideration for a covenant 
entered into after inception of employment. 3S In these jurisdictions there 
must be new consideration through the provision of additional benefits 
(e.g., a promotion, a salary increase, or an annuity) to the employee. 36 
Texas has been among the minority of jurisdictions following the 
alternate view that continued employment is sufficient consideration 
for the enforcement of a post-employment non-compete covenant. In 
McAnnally v. Person 37 a Texas court ruled that although the employee 
had worked three months before execution of the' covenant, the cove-
nant was supported by consideration. 38 More recently, in Martin v. 
Credit Protection Association,39 the Supreme Court of Texas did not 
dispute the finding of the trial court and the court of appeals that 
continued employment constituted consideration for Martin's covenant. 40 
2. Reasonableness 
It is generally held that in order to be enforceable, a non-compete 
covenant should be limited to a reasonable period of time. 41 Some courts 
have further specified that the duration must be limited to the period 
during which the covenantee remains in business. 42 
A host of subsidiary issues attend the basic requirement of 
geographic reasonableness. For example, Texas courts, among others, 
have held that where an express territorial restriction is unreasonably 
broad in scope, it can be modified by limiting the restriction to the 
area in which the former employee performed duties for his or her 
former employer. 43 A prohibition without express geographic boun-
daries can be similarly limited to the territory where the former employee 
34. Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration For Employee's Covenant Not To Compete, 
Entered into after Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 828 (1973). 
35. Id. at 830. 
36.Id. 
37. 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). 
38. Id. at 948. 
39. Supra note 5. 
40. Id. at 626. 
41. See e.g., Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Schmidt 
v. Central, 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1939); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973). 
42. See e.g., Campbell v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F.2d 
499 (9th Cir. 1987). 
43. See Eubank v. Puritan Chemical Co., 353 S.W.2d 90 error ref. nre (Tex. Civ. App. 
1962); Plating, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 201 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. 1965); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 
N.E.2d 481 (Mass); Martin v. Kiddie Sales and Services 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
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carried out his or her duties for her employer, 44 or to the former 
employer's business area,4S or to the former employer's customers. 46 
The third element of the reasonableness test requires an examina-
tion of the range of activities the covenant purports to ban.47 In light 
of the strong public policy opposing restraints of trade, the basic rule 
is that a narrower ban is more likely to be held enforceable than a 
broader one. 48 A covenant purporting to ban a former employee's pur-
suit of an entire occupation, even within a limited geographical area, 
is most objectionable. 49 
3. Employer's Business Interest 
The generally prevailing reasonableness test also provides that post-
employment restrictive covenants are enforceable only if and to the 
extent that they seek to protect a legitimate business interest of the 
former employer. so Traditionally, such interests comprised only pro-
prietary)nformation, notably, trade secrets and customer lists. S I This 
requirement is sometimes ignored, however, by courts that seem to 
enforce restrictive covenants on the most rudimentary of contract law 
principles, i.e., that the covenant is part of a bargained-for-exchange. S2 
Alternatively, courts have relied increasingly upon "uniqueness of 
employee services" as a legitimate and, therefore, protectable interest 
of the employer. S3 Purchasing Assocs. Inc. v. WeitzS4 illustrates the 
44. See Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 189 N.E.2d 559 (Mass. 1963); McAnally v. Person, 57 
S.W.2d 945 error ref. (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
45. See Brannen v. Bouley, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 
28 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1940); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1953), 
error ref. nre; and Thames v. Rotary Engineering Co., 315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
46. See Edgecomb v. Edmunston, 153 N.E. 99 (Mass. 1926); Martin v. Kiddie Sales and 
Service, 296 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); and Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. 
v. Vaus, 77 Misc. 2d 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1974). 
47. See Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 179 N.E. 169 (Mass. 1931). 
48. See e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1981); Pemco 
Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (W. Va. 1979); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 
(1971). 
49. See generally, Closius and Schaffer, supra note 1. 
50. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 653 (1960). 
51. See Id.; 6A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 1394, at 100 n.83 (1962); Meeker v. 
Stuart, 188 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D.D.C. 1960). Some authors have gone further and argued that 
"only trade secrets or confidential information constitute a protectable interest sufficient to justify 
any form of post associational restraint". Closius and Schaffer, supra, note 1 at 551. 
52. See e.g., Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 330 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); 
Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. SUpp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976). 
53. Kniffin, supra note 6 at 26; Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Services Contract 
in the Entertainment Industry at 21. 
54. 196 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1963). 
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emergence of the "uniqueness of employee services" standard as an 
independent basis for enforcement of a post-employment restrictive cove-
nant, rather than merely an additional factor to be considered while 
seeking to protect trade secrets and customer lists. l5 The Purchasing 
Assocs. court enunciated a standard, explaining that jt is not enough 
to show that the individual excels at his work or that his .or her ser-
vices are of great value to the employer. S6 . "[T]here must be a finding 
that his services are of such character as to make [the employee's] 
replacement impossible or that the loss of [the employee's] services 
would cause the employer irreparable injury."s7 
Other jurisdictions, including Texas, generally claim to follow this 
standard. S8 Unfortunately, the standard has at least two problems. First, 
it is not clear, in practice, whether the employee's services must be 
truly unique or just very important. S9 Secondly, and more important-
ly, even if the services are unique, "there is no significant correlation 
between uniqueness of the employee's services and the reasonableness 
of restraining him from accepting employment with another 
employer. "60 The former employee's skills and abilities, even if 
developed and/or enhanced while working for the former employer, 
belong to the employee and should not, therefore, constitute a legitimate 
basis for the restraint. 6 I Moreover, even if the employee's departure 
causes irreparable harm to the former employer, enforcement of the 
negative covenant will not make the covenantee whole, but only punish 
the covenantor. Punishment is not generally considered a proper ob-
55. Id. at 248. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 250. 
58. Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Not To Compete Involving Radio or Televi-
sion Personality, 36 A.L.R.3d 1139 (1985). 
59. The ambiguity of the standard is illustrated by the opinion in Bradford v. New York 
Times Co., a suit contesting the enforceability of a post-employment restrictive covenant stipulating 
the forfeiture of retirement benefits as liquidated damages. Bradford had worked for the Times 
for 16 years, during which time he had served in capacities including General Manager, Vice 
President, and Director. After leaving the Times, Bradford violated the covenant by going to 
work for a competitor. The Times terminated his retirement benefits amounting to approximately 
one half million dollars. Bradford sued. The United States Court of Appeals upheld the restric-
tive covenant on the basis of Bradford's "uniqueness", which it found to be inherent in his 
"broad and vital corporate responsibilities" and his having been the "number two man" at 
the Times. The court's position has intuitive appeal, but probably only because we assume he 
"number two man" must have had virtually unfettered access to proprietary information (e.g., 
trade secrets and customer lists). If the court is protecting proprietary information, it does not 
need the uniqueness standard. If it is protecting something else, that should be made clear. 501 
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974). 
60. Kniffin, supra note 6; at 27. 
61. C. Kaufman, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 13918 (Supp. 1982); Hallmark Personnel of 
Texas v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 
160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928). 
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jective of contract law, even in the event of breach. 62 A fortiori, it 
is an improper objective when there has been no breach but only a 
termination of employment pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
C. Statutory Solutions 
Legislatures in several jurisdictions have statutorily addressed the 
enforceability of post-employment non-compete covenants. 63 The 
resulting legislation falls generally into two categories: prohibition and 
limitation. An example of each approach is discussed briefly below. 
1. Prohibition 
California courts have not adhered to the reasonableness test since 
1872.64 The California legislature enacted a statute which provides that 
"every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void. "65 
62. E. Farnsworth, supra note 34, sec. 12.8 at 842. 
63. ALA. CODE Sec. 8·1-1 (1984 Rep!.); ALASKA STAT. Sec. 45.50.562, 45.50.574 (1986); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 44-1401 (1967 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. Sec. 8-2-113(2) (1986 
Rep!.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 35-26 (1981 rev.); FLA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 542.33 (West Supp. 
1987); GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 13-8-2 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. Sec. 480-4(c) (1976 Rep!.); IDAHO 
CODE Sec. 48-101 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 24-1-1-1 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. 
Sec. 553-4 (West Supp. 1986); !UN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 50-112 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. Sec. 23:921 
(West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, Sec. 4 (West 1984); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
Sec. 445-772 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.Sec. 3250.51 (West 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. 
Sec. 75-21-1 (1972»; Mo. ANN. STAT. Sec. 416.031 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 28-2-703 
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. Sec. 59-801 (Reissue 1984); N.J. REV. STAT. Sec. 56:9-3 (Supp. 1986); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. Sec. 57-1-1 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW Sec. 340 (McKinney 1968 
& Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. Sec. 75·4 (Rep!. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE Sec. 9-08"06 (1975 
Rep!.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 1331.06 (Anderson 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 Sec. 
217 (West 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
Sec. 53-9-11 (Supp. 1986); TENJoI. CODE ANN. Sec. 47-25-101 (1984 Rep!.); VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 
591-9.5 (1982 Rep!.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 19.86.030 (1978); W. VA. CODE Sec. 47-18-3 
(1986 Rep!.); WIS. STAT. ANN. Sec. 133.03 (West Supp. 1986). 
64. See Bosley Med. Group v. Abramson, 207 CAL. RPTR. 477, 480 (1984). 
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16600 (West 1987). Former California Civil Code Sec-
tion 1673 was the predecessor to the present Section. It was adopted in 1872 following the in-
troduction, by Senator Pendegrast of Napa County, of Senate Bill 430 entitled "An Act to Establish 
a Civil Code." The Measure passed the Senate on March 15, 1872, and the Assembly on March 
16, 1872. A review of the 1871.annotations indicates that Sec. 1673 was taken verbatim from 
Sec. 833 of the 1865 draft of a Civil Code for the State of New York. The New York Civil 
Code was primarily a codification of prior common law. See, The Journal of The Senate, 19th 
Session: Legislature ~f the State of California (1871-72) at 575; Revised Laws of the State of 
California; in four codes, Political, Civil, Civil Procedure and Penal, at 329-30. Compare, The 
Civil Code of the State of New York by the Commissioners of the Code (1865) at 255-56. 
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The statute's applicability to personal services contracts is settled. 66 
If a post-employment non-compete covenant only prohibits the 
former employee from revealing trade secrets or confidential informa-
tion such as customer lists, California courts will generally enforce the 
covenant. 67 However, if a post-employment covenant has territorial 
and/ or durational restrictions, it is generally unenforceable. 68 The ra-
tionale behind the courts' rulings is that non-compete covenants are 
repugnant to California's public policy. 69 
Statutory exceptions exempt sales of businesses70 and dissolutions 
of partnerships71 from the general prohibition. Post-employment non-
compete clauses in employment contracts, however, are not covered 
by these exceptions and hence, are void in California. 72 Trade secret, 
customer lists and other proprietary information are protected by other 
legal principles, including those of agency. 73 
66. Frame v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 97 CAL. RPTR. 811 (1971); Buskuhl 
v. Family Life Ins. Co. 76 CAL. RPTR. 602 (1969). 
67. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 CAL. RPTR. 836, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (App. 6 Dist. 
1985); Rigging Intern. Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 180 CAL. RPTR. 451, 128 C.A.3d 594 (1982). 
68. See Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, cert. denied, 71 S. Ct. 570, 340 U.S. 954; 
see also KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 CAL. RPTR. 571, 104 C.A.3d 844 (1980). 
69. See Fidelity Credit Assur. Co. of California v. Cosby, 265 P. 372, 90 C.A. 22; Frame, 
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 97 CAL. RPTR. 811, 20 C.A.3d 668 (1971). 
70. The specific language of the statutory exception provides: "Any person who sells the 
good will of a business, or any shareholder of a corporation selling or otherwise disposing of 
all his shares in said corporation, or any shareholder of a corporation which sells (a) all or 
substantially all of its operating assets together with the goodwill of the corporation, (b) all 
or substantially all of the operating assets of a division or a subsidiary of the corporation together 
with the goodwill of such division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the share of any subsidiary, may 
agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county 
or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, in which the business so sold, or that of said cor-
poration, division, or subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriv-
ing title to the goodwill or shares from him, carries on like business therein. For the purposes 
of this section, subsidiary shall mean any corporation, a majority of whose voting shares are 
owned by the selling corporation." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16601 (West 1987). 
71. Id. The specific language provides: "Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of dissolu-
tion of the partnership, agree that he will not carryon a similar business within a specified 
county or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, where the partnership business has been 
transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or any person deriving title to the 
business or its goodwill from any such other member of the partnership, carries on a like business 
therein." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE Sec. 16602 (West 1987). 
72. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 CAL. RPTR. 836, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (App. 6 Dist. 
1985); Campbell v. Bd. of Trustees of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F.2d 
499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987); But see Rigging Intern. Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 180 CAL. RPTR. 
451 (1982). ~ 
73. See Restatement (Second) of Agency. Sec. 396(a)-(d) (1957). 
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2. Limitation 
A Louisiana statute declares void any non-compete agreement which 
the employer may "require or direct any employee to enter into.'''4 
However, such a restriction may be enforceable if it does not exceed 
two years, and "the employer incurs an expense in the training of the 
employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business .. ."75 
Louisiana courts have made it clear that the expense must be substan-
tial and the referenced advertisement must connect the employee-
covenantor with the business. 76 
III. THE TEXAS TRADITION, MARTIN AND DESANTIS 
Texas courts have generally followed the prevailing common law 
approach as outlined above, and held specifically that a non-compete 
covenant is (1) a restraint of trade and enforceable only if reasonable;77 
(2) unreasonable "if it is greater than is required for the protection 
of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes 
undue hardship upon the person restricted;"78 (3) unenforceable unless 
reasonable as to duration, geographic scope and range of activities pro-
hibited;79 and (4) unenforceable if injurious to the public interest. 80 
Reasonableness is a question of law for the court,81 and a Texas court 
can modify a restriction to make it reasonable or, without formally 
modifying the covenant, enforce it only to a reasonable extent. 82 In 
addition, an employer/covenantee who seeks injunctive relief has the 
burden of proving reasonableness. 83 
Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbe1l84 is the root of contem-
porary Texas case law regarding post-employment non-compete 
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 23:291 (West 1985). 
75. Id. 
76. See, Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. La. 1965) aff'd 347 
F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965). 
77. Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960). 
78. [d.; Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (1983). 
79. Frankiewicz v. National Compo Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (1982). 
80. Matlock v. Data Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 329 (1981). 
81. Henshaw V. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d at 418. 
82. See, e.g., Matlock V. Data Processing Sec. Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 329; Justin Belt CO. 
V. Yost, 502 S.W.2d at 685; Spinksv. Riebold, 310 S.W.2d 668, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 
1958, writ ref'd). 
83. Custom Drapery CO. V. Hardwick, 531 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 
[1st Dist.) 1975, no writ). 
84. 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960). 
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covenants. Weatherford was a suit to enforce non-compete covenants 
. against three former employees of a company involved in manufactur-
ing and selling oil field equipment. 85 Upon commencement of employ-
ment, each of the defendant employees (two salesmen and an office 
worker) signed covenants not to compete with Weatherford for one 
year after termination of employment. 86 Soon after termination of 
employment, they violated these covenants by organizing a company 
that competed with Weatherford. 87 Weatherford sought and was denied 
an injunction and the court of appeals affirmed. 88 
Weatherford appealed and the Supreme Court of Texas, in affirm-
ing the court of appeals, adopted the reasonableness test generally 
described in Part II of this article. 89 Applying the test, the court found 
that the absence of any territorial limitation in the covenant meant 
enforcement would preclude covenantors from operating their new 
business anywhere in the world. 90 The court found this result 
unreasonable;91 and while modification might be appropriate when 
equitable relief was sought, Weatherford's prayer for an injunction 
had become moot and "an action for damages ... must stand or fall 
on the contract as written. "92 Thus, the court refused to award 
damages. 93 
The court reaffirmed and clarified Weatherford 21 years later in 
Matlock v. Data Processing Security, Inc. 94 Matlock involved efforts 
by Data Processing Services, Inc. ("DPS") to prevent competition by 
Matlock and two other former DPS employees who quit their jobs 
with DPS, established another company, and began to compete with 
DPS in violation of non-compete covenants signed by the employees. 
The covenantors sought a declaratory judgment that the covenants were 
85. Id. at 951. 
86. Id. The covenant stated: "I hereby contract and agree that for a period of one year 
from the date of the termination of my employment, for any reason, I will neither enter into 
a business offering like merchandise to that offered by Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc., 
nor assist either directly or indirectly any competitor of Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc., 
or any other person, company or organization in offering like mechandise to that offered by 
Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc., in any area where Weatherford Oil Tool Company, Inc. 
may be operating or carrying on business during said one year period." Id. 
87. Id. 
88. 327 S.W.2d 76. 
89. 340 S.W.2d 950, 951. Lacking Texas precedent, the .court cited the Restatement of 
Contracts and A.L.R. Annotations. 
90. Id. at 152. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 953. 
93.Id. 
94. 618 S.W.2d 327 (1981). 
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void. 9S DPS sought and was granted a temporary injunction pending 
trial on the merits, and Matlock appealed. 96 
The Supreme Court of Texas upheld that portion of the injunc-
tion that prohibited covenantors' use or disclosure of trade secrets or 
confidential business information of DPS,97 but found the prohibitions 
regarding use of "know-how" and information pertaining to "pros-
pective customers of DPS" too vague to be enforced. 98 The court also 
found the covenants' geographic scope (the whole of the United States) 
unreasonable because DPS. had no protectable interest that reached 
throughout the U.S. 99 The court affirmed the temporary injunction 
as modified, after citing Weatherford and restating the general pro-
position that: 
A determination of the reasonableness of territorial restraints upon 
non-competition .contracts requires a balance of the interests of 
the employer, the employee, and the public while bei~g "mindful 
of the basic policies of individual liberty, freedom of contract, 
freedom of trade, protection of business, encouragement of com-
petition and discouragement of monopoly." 100 
The current formulation of the Texas rule was set forth in a 1987 
case styled Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. 101 A brief analysis of the 
Hill case is necessary to a discussion of the Texas Supreme Court's 
recent opinions in Martin and DeSantis. 
A. HILL 
Hill involved a non-compete covenant included in a franchise agree-
ment between Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. ("Mobile") as franchisor and 
Joel Hill as franchisee. The essence of the agreement was that Hill 
would pay approximately $42,000 and five percent of his gross revenue 
from a mobile automobile trim and repair business in exchange for 
the use of Mobile's name and good will and an equipped van provided 
95. Id. at 328. 
96.Id. 
97. Id. at 329. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. DPS had done business with less than two percent of the potential U.S. Market. 
Id. at 328. 
100. Id. at 329, quoting, in part, from Fidelity Union Life Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co. 
356 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (N.D. Tex. 1972). 
101. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987). 
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by Mobile. 102 The lengthy and detailed non-compete covenant provided 
that after termination of the franchise agreement, Hill would not com-
pete with Mobile, directly or indirectly, for a period of three years. 103 
The prohibition covered seven counties, including the two within which 
Hill's franchise areas were located. 104 After approximately two and one 
half years, Mobile terminated the agreement because of Hill's delin-
quency in the payment of his franchise fees. lOS Hill violated the non-
compete covenant by soliciting a Mobile customer almost immediately. 106 
Mobile sought and was granted a temporary injunction. ,07 
On appeal to the state Supreme Court, Hill argued that the non-
compete agreement was a restraint of trade and unreasonable. lOS The 
court set forth a four part test for reasonableness, indicating that a 
non-compete covenant is unenforceable in Texas unless it is: 
(1) necessary for the protection of the promisee; 
(2) reasonable as to time, territory and activity and not oprressive 
to the promisor; 
(3) not injurious to the community; and 
(4) supported by consideration. 109 
The court announced its conclusion that the Hill covenant was 
102. Id. at 169. 
103. Id. at 170. The provision read as follows: 
Franchisee (Hill) agrees that upon termination of this Franchise Agreement, for 
whatever reason, Franchisee shall not directly or indirectly, as an officer, director, 
shareholder, proprietor, partner, consultant, employee or in any other individual 
or representative capacity, engage, participate or become involved in any business 
that is in competition in any manner whatsoever with the business of the Company 
or its franchisees. Furthermore, it is understood between the parties that substan-
tial goodwill will exist [sic) between the Company and the managers of the various 
car dealerships serviced by the Company and the Company's franchisees. Because 
said managers are transient and frequently change employment among car dealer-
ships, Franchisee further agrees that upon termination of this Franchise Agree-
ment, for whatever reason, Franchisee will not directly or indirectly in any manner 
whatsoever, contact said managers (irrespective of the car dealerships that employ 
them) regarding business in competition with the Company. This covenant shall 
extend for a period of three (3) years following the termination of this Franchise 
Agreement or any renewal hereof. Further, this covenant shall cover the following 
geographic area during said period: The following Texas Counties: Dallas, Tarrant, 
Ellis, Denton, Rockwall, Kaufman, and Collin. 
104. Id. at 169. 
105. Id. at 170. 
106. Id. 
107. 704 S.W.2d 384. 
108. 725 S.W.2d at 169. 
109. Id. at 170-71. 
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"plagued by a lack of reasonableness," 110 then proceeded to identify 
three general problems with the restraint. III 
1. Consideration 
First, the court said, the covenant was not supported by considera-
tion. 112 However, in attempting to support this conclusion with a discus-
sion of training and trade secrets, 113 the court demonstrated its confu-
sion regarding a simple point: the covenant was part of the franchise 
agreement and supported by the same consideration that made the agree-
ment enforceable. I 14 
The court distinguished post-employment non-compete covenants 
from non-compete covenants associated with sales of businesses, thereby 
implying recognition that restrictive covenants in different business con-
texts might be subject to different analyses. I I S Next, however, the court 
proceeded to analyze the Hill covenant as though it was part of a simple 
employment agreement rather than a franchisor-franchisee relation-
ship.1l6 This choice (or oversight) should have made the consideration 
issue an easy one, as the law across U.S. jurisdictions is uniform on 
this point: if a non-compete covenant is executed simultaneously with 
and as part of an employment contract, the employment itself con-
stitutes consideration for the covenant. I 17 Texas is in accord. I IS 
Moreover, Texas is among a minority of jurisdictions that take a more 
liberal view of the consideration requirement in the context of post-
employment non-compete covenants. 119 
Thus, the majority opinion in Hill seems clearly to reflect a 
misunderstanding of the consideration requirement and how it is met. 
110. Id. at 170. 
Ill. It would appear, although the court did not state, that anyone of the problems cited 
would have been fatal to the covenant. 
112. 725 S.W.2d at 171. 
'113. Id. 
114. See supra note 35 and associated text. 
115. 725 S.W.2d at 170. 
116. See infra note 128 and associated text. 
117. See supra note 35 and associated text. 
118. See, e.g., Garcia v. Laredo Collections, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1980, no writ). 
119. When the execution of a covenant not to compete is contemporaneous with the accept-
ance of employment, the latter becomes the consideration for the covenant. A question has arisen, 
however, whether an agreement not to compete executed after employment has commenced is 
supported by consideration ... Texas courts have held that continued employment is sufficient 
consideration for a covenant not to compete. Id. 
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2. Employer's Interest 
Secondly, the court said Mobile had no legitimate business interest 
to protect. 120 In most jurisdictions, this requirement would be met readily 
by Mobile's customer lists and Hill's contacts on behalf of Mobile, 
i.e., by Mobile's goodwill. 121 
In Texas, "goodwill" has been defined as "that value which in-
heres in fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from 
established and well conducted business."122 Traditionally,Texas courts 
have had no difficulty attaching value to business goodwill. 123 One Texas 
court held that a restrictive covenant was enforceable 
where the good will of the employer's customers had attached to 
the employee during the latter's employment and the employee thus 
had acquired during his employment a special influence which gave 
him an advantage over the employer in competition for the 
customer's business. 124 
Another concluded that 
most courts recognize that an employer has a sufficient interest 
in retaining his customers to support an employee's covenant 
whenever the employee's relationship with customers is such that 
there is a substantial risk that he may be able to divert all or part 
of their business. 12s 
And just four years prior to Hill, Texas law still provided that a 
covenantee 
had a right to protect himself from the possibility that [covenan-
tor] would establish a rapport with the clients of the business and 
upon termination take a segment of that clientele with him.126 
In Hill, however, the Texas Supreme Court not only refused to 
120. 725 S.W.2d at 171. 
121. See supra note 51 and associated text. 
122. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mercer, 58 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933) 
rev'd on other grounds, 90 S.W.2d 557 (1936). 
123. "Such value is based necessarily upon prospective profits to result from voluntarily 
continued patronage of the public." Id. 
124. Kidde Sales & Service, Inc. v. Peairson, 493 S.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ). . 
125. Hospital Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 
1975). 
126. Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983). 
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recognize Mobile's protectable interest in such goodwill but, amazingly, 
declared that the goodwill actually belonged to Hill.127 It is noteworthy 
that the court did not limit this conclusion to situations involving fran-
chise agreements, as opposed to employment. Indeed, the court appeared 
to use the terms "employee" and "franchisee" interchangeably and 
even melded them into one: "employee/franchisee" .128 
3. The "Common Calling" Issue 
Third, and potentially most troublesome for the future, the court's 
majority adopted a new rule, concluding that no restrictive covenant 
should be enforced against anyone engaged in a "common calling."129 
The court did not define "common calling,"130 but introduced the rule 
in discussing the question whether the covenant was "oppressive to 
the promissor." 131 The court concluded the enforcement of the coven-
ant was oppressive to Hill, stating 
[n]ot only has he lost his franchise and investment therein, he is 
now prevented from using his previously acquired skills and talent 
to support him and his family in the county of their residence. 132 
If the Hill majority's "common calling" rule is a sub-issue in the 
"oppression" part of the four-pronged test of enforceability, 133 the 
Hill opinion signaled a significant policy shift away from recent Texas 
cases upholding restrictive covenants even when convenantors would 
clearly be required to seek work in a different field,l34 or in a different 
area of the same field. 135 
127. 725 S.W.2d at 171. 
128. Id. at 171-72. 
129. Id. at 172. 
130. Neither did the Utah case to which the Texas court attributed the rule: Robbins v. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (1982), but a subsequent Texas case establishes that a hairdresser is 
engaged in a common calling-even if designated "shop manager". Bergman v. Norris oj Houston, 
734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1987). Meanwhile, the Utah court seems to have backed away from the 
"common calling" issue and returned to a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., System Concepts, 
Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983). (post-employment non-compete covenant enforceable 
against national sales manager of cable television equipment company where covenant was 
reasonable in time and area and necessary to protect covenantee's good will). 
131. See supra note 109 and associated text. 
132. 725 S.W.2d at 172. 
133. See supra note 109 and associated text. 
134. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 501 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, 
writ dism'd w.o.j.). 
135. Electronic Data Systems v. Powell, 524 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975. 
writ ref. 'd n.r.e.). 
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Alternatively, the "common calling" test may be a part of the 
inquiry into the employer's protectable interest. I.e., an employee 
engaged in a common calling, perhaps definitionally, does not provide 
unique services and, therefore, the employer/covenantee is necessarily 
deprived of the "unique services" rationale for enforcement of the 
covenant. 136 This seems to be the approach taken by the Supreme Court 
of Utah, from which the Hill court borrowed the common calling rule. 137 
Within two years of adopting the common calling rule, the Utah court 
backed away from that formulation, reverting to the more common 
(arguably inverse) statement of the proposition: 
to justify enforcement of a restrictive covenant by injunctive relief 
the employer must show not only goodwill, but that the services 
rendered by the employee were special, unique or extra-ordinary. 138 
This approach would be consistent with prior Texas case law. 139 
Whatever the current position in Utah, it seems the Hill majority 
left an important gap in the protection available to an 
employer/covenantee. By flatly refusing to enforce post-employment 
non-compete covenants against employees engaged in common call-
ings, the Texas court left employers with no protection against "com-
mon calling" convenantors who would misuse customer listS.140 It is 
against this extremely problematic doctrinal background that Martin 
and DeSantis must be assessed. 142 
136. See supra notes 53-62 and associated text. 
137. See supra note 130. 
138. System Concepts Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). For the quoted proposition, 
the Utah court cited Robbins v. Finlay 645 P.2d 623, 627-8 (Utah 1982) the case in which it 
established the common calling rule. The words "common calling", however, are conspicuously 
absent from the more recent opinion. 
139. See supra note 58; Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 
[14th Dist.) 1974, no writ). 
140. The Utah court upheld the portion of the covenant that prohibited misuse of customer 
leads, even as it established the common calling rule. 646 P .2d at 627. This point seems to have 
escaped the Hill majority. Customer leads are not readily protectable by trade secrets law. Crouch 
v. Swing Mach. Co., 468 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1971, no writ). 
141. 725 S.W.2d at 172. ' 
142. Justice Gonzalez's dissent comprises a thorough critique of the majority opinion in 
Hill. Id. See also, White, " 'Common Callings' and the Enforcement of Post-employment 
Covenants in Texas" 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 3,589-619 (1988); Note, "Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, 
Inc.: The Common Calling Standard," 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 2, 297-320 (1988). 
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B. Martin 
The Martin case involved a three year non-compete covenant signed 
by an employee three years after the commencement of employment 
with a collection agency, upon the condition that he would be terminated 
if he did not sign the covenant. 143 Two years after signing the coven-
ant, Martin quit his job at Credit Protection Association ("CPA"), 
joined with others to organize a new business, and began competing 
with CPA.144 This competition included solicitation of CPA customers 
with whom Martin had dealt while employed at CPA. 145 CPA sought 
an injunction and damages. 146 
The trial court found that CPA's collection process comprised 
neither trade secrets nor confidential information, and held, on that 
basis, that CPA had not met its burden of showing a protectable 
employer interest. 147 The trial court went on to hold, however, that 
CPA had a protectable interest in a list of 1200 customers with whom 
Martin had dealt on CPA's behalf and that CPA was entitled to limited 
injunctive protection. 148 
The court of appeals affirmed. 149 In finding the four-part Hill test 
satisfied, 1'0 the court of appeals held that (1) Martin's "customer con-
tact" was a legitimate interest of CPA, (2) that Martin was not 
"oppressed" by the three year restriction, (3) the restraint was not in-
jurious to the public and (4) the training and salary received by Martin 
comprised consideration to make the covenant enforceable. 1'1 Addi-
tionally, the court of appeals concluded that Martin was not engaged 
in a "common calling, such as a barber, but, to the contrary ... [was] 
unique to all CPA customers."J52 
The Texas Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, confirmed the con-
tinuing viability of the Hill test but did not comment on the manner 
in which the court of appeals had applied the test in the Martin case. IB 
143. Martin v. Credit Protection Assoc., 757 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1988). 
144. Id. at 26. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 26-7. 
148. Id. at 27. The trial court also awarded plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees, but denied 
CPA's prayer for exemplary damages. Id. 
149. Id. at 31. 
150. See supra, note 91, and associated text. 
151. Martin v. Credit Protection Assoc., supra, note 5 at 29. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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Instead, the Supreme Court rested its decision on the common calling 
issue, stating that: 
Martin was and is a salesman, a "common calling" occupation. 
We will not restrain the right of any individual to engage in a com-
mon calling. 154 
The Supreme Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of 
appeals, dissolved the injunction, and heid· the restrictive covenant 
vold.1B . 
The court's brief opinion and terse conclusion with respect to the 
pivotal issue shed little light on the obvious question: what is a "com-
mon calling" occupation in Texas? It would seem, however, that in 
~ejecting the court of appeals' conclusion that Martin's was not a com-
m_on calling, the Supreme Court rejected the rationale upon which that 
conclusion was based, i.e., that Miutin had become "unique to all CPA 
customers." I S6 
Employee "uniqueness", as a factor to be considered in enforc-
ing non-compete covenants, is problematic. 1S7 It is clear, however, that 
~he court of appeals' reliance on the "uniqueness" concept is misplaced. 
Unique employee services may comprise a protect able employer interest 
and may serve, by mutual exclusion, to define "common calling", but 
the court of appeals broke new ground in using employee's uniqueness 
to convenatee's customers as a basis for concluding that the employee 
was not engaged in a common calling. The appeals court's concept 
of uniqueness seems dangerously close to the truism that each of us 
is unique. (i.e., one of a kind). Whatever "uniqueness" means in this 
context, it must mean more than that no two people are exactly alike. 
Otherwise, no one can be engaged in a common calling or, at most, 
a common calling situation could arise only when multiple salespeople 
were assigned to the same clients and! or territory-and the clients con-
sidered those sales people fungible. The state supreme court's opinion 
arrested movement in this direction, but did nothing to define "com-
mon calling". 
154. [d. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. 
157. See supra, notes 59-62 and associated text. 
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C. DeSantis 
The opinion in Desantis is considerably more detailed than that 
in Martin. In 1981, as a condition of the commencement his employ-
ment by the Wackenhut Corporation, DeSantis signed an agreement 
that he would riot compete with Wackenhut, within a 40 county area, 
for a period of two years following the termination of his employ-
ment. 1 58 The agreement provided that its interpretation and enforce-
ment would be governed by Florida lawY9 In 1984, DeSantis resigned, 
established a competing business and began soliciting customers, in~ 
eluding some Wackenhut customers with whom he had dealt while 
employed by Wackenhut. 160 
Wackenhut sought an injunction and monetary damages, alleging 
breach of contract and tortious interference with contract and business 
relations. 16i The idal court issued an injunction, after reducirig th~ 
geographic ar~a of the proscription from 40 counties to 13. 162 The court 
of appeals affirrried and DeSantis appealed. 163 
1. Choice of Law 
The Su:preme Court of Texas first considered the parties' choice 
of Florida law. The court adopted the rule of Section 187 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, providing, inter alia, that (1) there 
must be a reaspnable relationship between the parties and the state 
whose law is chosen and (2) the law of that state must not be contrary 
to any fundamental public policy of the forum state. 164 The court found 
the "reasonable relationship" aspect of the test satisfied. 16s 
Turning to the public policy question, the court cited several dif-
ferences between the relevant laws of Texas and Florida. In Florida, 
the court said, non-compete covenants are made enforceable by statute 
and courts are not empowered to refuse enforcement even when the 
covenant "would produce an unjust result in the form of an overly 
158. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 617. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. 
163. 732 S.W.2d 29. 
164. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1971), Section 187. 
165. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 618. 
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burdensome effect upon the employee."166 Additionally, the Texas court 
asserted, Florida courts relax their normal standards for granting in-
junctive relief by presuming irreparable injury in the context of non-
compete covenants. 167 Finally, the Texas court found that Florida courts 
"give no consideration to the type of work done by the employee. 
Thus, Florida courts have enforced convenants not to compete against 
hairstylists, telephone salespersons, and secretaries."168 The Texas court 
found these considerations, taken together, sufficient to nullify the 
partie's choice of Florida law on the grounds that Flordia law regar-
ding non-compete covenants is "contrary to the fundamental Texas 
public policy of promoting free movement of workers in the job 
market." 169 
2. What is Reasonable? 
Testing the DeSantis covenant under Texas law, the court first 
determined that DeSantis, as an established professional in the security 
field and an office manager handling millions of dollars in gross an-
nual revenues for Wackenhut, was not engaged in a common calling. 170 
The court then proceeded to apply the Hill test, finding that the cove-
nant failed two of the test's four parts. First, the jury had failed to 
find that Wackenhut would be irreparably harmed by DeSantis' com-
petition. This failure, the Texas Supreme Court held, was "essentially 
equivalent to a failure to find that the covenant was necessary to pro-
tect Wackenhut."171 This conclusion is unjustified, however, because 
the jury did not need to find irreparable harm under Florida Law, 
which presumes such harm.172 
Secondly, the court held that the covenant was not supported by 
consideration, since "DeSantis had more than fourteen years as an 
established professional in the security business before he joined 
Wackenhut" and there was "no evidence that DeSantis obtained any 
special knowledge or training from Wackenhut."173 
166. Id., citing Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So.2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980) rev. den. 419 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1982). 
167. Id., citing Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
168. Id. citing, Tiffany Sands, Inc. v. Mezhibousky, 463 So.2d 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985); Channell v. Applied Research, Inc. 472 So.2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Rollins 
Protective Services Co. v. Lammons, 472 So.2d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
169. Id. at 620. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. See supra, note 167 and associated text. 
173. DeSantis, supra note 5 at 620. 
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On this point the court is simply incorrect in its application of 
the law. Consideration for an employee's non-compete covenant entered 
into at the inception of employment is found in the employment itself, 
i.e., in the compensation the employee is promised and paid.174 Although 
jurisdictions differ on the question whether mere continuation of 
employment is consideration for a covenant signed after an employee 
has begun work,17S there is broad judicial consensus that a non-compete 
covenant included in an initial employment agreement (as was DeSantis') 
is supported by the same consideration that makes the rest of the agree-
ment enforceable, i.e., the promise of compensation.176 The issue 
mislabeled "consideration" by the Texas Supreme Court should properly 
have been considered in connection with the question of whether 
Wackenhut, as covenantee, had a protectable interest (e.g., trade secrets 
or customer lists) at stake. Here, the court has further compounded 
the confusion evident in its discussion of the consideration issue in 
the Hill case. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of these two conclusions, the court found 
the covenant unreasonable and, therefore, unenforceable. 177 The court 
then turned its attention to DeSantis' counterclaims. 
3. Covenantor's Counterclaims 
At the trial level, DeSantis and RDI (DeSantis' newly formed com-
pany) brought counterclaims for monetary damages, fraud and tor-
tious interference with Contractual relations. 178 Before the Supreme 
Court of Texas, they contested the denial of their damages claim, the 
grant of summary judgment for Wackenhut on the tortious interference 
claim, and the grant of a directed verdict for Wackenhut on the fraud 
claim. 179 
The claim for monetary damages was based on alternative theories: 
(1) a common law cause of action based on wrongful issuance of an 
injunction, and (2) a statutory claim that the covenant was an illegal 
restraint of trade, violating the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust 
Act. 180 The court held that because it had found the covenant unen-
forceable, DeSantis and RDI were entitled to damages. l8l RDI was 
174. See supra, note 35. 
175. See supra notes 36-37 and associated text. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. 
178. DeSantis, supra. 
179. [d. 
180. TEXAS Bus. & COM. CODE Sec. 15.21(a)(I). 
181. [d. at 621. 
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awarded $18,000 actual damages as found by the jury, prejudgment 
interest and costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. 182 DeSantis recovered 
only attorney's fees and costs as the jury had found that he sustained 
no actual damage. 183 Ominously, the court also stated that. although 
there had been no showing of willfulness or flagrant misconduct by 
Wackenhut, the presence of these elements would have made treble 
damages appropriate. 184 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the Martin and DeSantis cases appear to cast serious doubt 
upon the continuing viability of post-employment non-compete 
covenants' in Texas, they are not clear and logical steps towards an 
articulated policy objective. Instead, they compound and may tend to 
institutionalize the confusion created by the majority opinion in Hill. 
Thus, although the Supreme Court of Texas would appear to be at 
the forefront of efforts to reign in restrictive covenants, recent Texas 
case law provides inadequate footing for a successful attack on such 
restraints. 
182. [d. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. 
